This section provides a more detailed discussion of the bank-level results discussed in Section 3.1.2 of the main paper. Table 2 in the main text of the paper reported result for estimating Eq. (2) when using Call Report data on the overall amount of lending, the amount of mortgage lending, and the amount of C&I lending. In this section, our analysis goes further. Using data collected under the HMDA and aggregated to the bank-level, we provide further evidence on the effect on lending for residential housing. Importantly, the (confidential) version of HMDA data that we use, allows us to estimate regressions at the quarterly level (rather than the annual level which is the frequency in public HMDA data) to get a more precise sense of the timing of effects.
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As described in the main text, we construct our bank-level exposure measure as a bank's MBS scaled by total assets. Fig. C.1 shows the distribution of the exposure measure averaged over the four quarters prior to QE1. More than a quarter of all commercial banks held no MBS at all, and the average MBS-to-asset ratio was around 12% in the upper quartile of the cross-sectional distribution across banks.
[FIGURE C.1 ABOUT HERE]
It's then of natural interest to ask what observable differences are their across banks with different degree of MBS exposure. Table D .1 gives a sense of those differences, splitting the sample of all commercial banks in the United States by the median of the average MBS share in the 4 quarters prior to QE1. While banks with higher MBS shares tend to be larger and tend to operate with higher leverage than banks with relatively lower MBS shares, banks sorted by MBS shares are otherwise very similar in other observable characteristics.
[TABLES D.1 and D.2 ABOUT HERE] As in Section 3.1.2 of the main paper, we can then assess the effect of the Fed's actions at the bank level by employing a difference-in-differences (DiD) design with a continuous treatment variable. The unit of observation is the commercial bank and the recall main specification Eq. (2) is given by:
As before, y b,t is the natural logarithm of the amount of lending of bank b at time t. We use different categories of lending and distinguish between newly originated and refinanced mortgages as well as between small business loans of different sizes. We use use data on residential mortgages from HMDA and data on small business lending from the CRA. As before, we estimate the regression for each episode of quantitative easing, j = 1, 2, 3, with a time window of four quarters before and after the introduction of the respective program. All results are robust to changing the time window as well as to pooling events in a single regression. QE (j) t is an indicator variable equal to 1 after the introduction of the j-th round of quantitative easing. Given that the data on the commercial bank level is quarterly, we choose 2009Q1 as the event date for QE1, and 2010Q4 and 2012Q4 as the event dates for QE2 and QE3, respectively. We measure bank b's MBS-to-assets ratio, MBS Total Assets (j) b , as the average ratio over the 4 quarters prior to the j-th round of QE.
Additionally, our regression includes bank-fixed effects, γ b , and time-fixed effects, τ t , to control for fixed differences between banks and for differences over time that affect all banks. We include K bank-specific time-varying controls X (k) b to control for remaining differences between banks. Controls included in the regression are listed in Table D .2. Note that as before, we also allow for changes in the relation between controls and outcome variables in response to QE by interacting control variables with QE event dummies. Table D .5 shows the estimates from Eq. (2) using the amount of refinanced mortgages as well as newly issued mortgages as dependent variables. Columns (1) and (2) confirm the results for total real estate lending from the Call Report data in Table 2 in the main text. The additional specifications distinguish between new origination of mortgages and refinancing of existing mortgages. Even though aggregate lending related to housing increased during QE1 and QE3, the underlying type of lending is different. In particular, results in columns (3) and (4) reveal that the effect during QE1 is driven by increased refinancing activity of affected banks, consistent with the findings by Di Maggio et al. (2018) , who show that QE1 spurred refinancing activity in the mortgage market. Columns (5) and (6) show that the effect of QE3 is driven by origination of mortgages for new home purchases and by refinancing of existing mortgages.
[TABLE D.5 ABOUT HERE]
Using additional data collected under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) on small business lending, we estimate the main specification using four related types of small business lending as dependent variables: loans to small business with face value of $ 0 to 100k, $ 100k to 250k, and $ 250k to 1m, as well as loans to businesses with an annual revenue of less than $ 1 million. Table 2 , small business lending does not respond in any category after QE1 and estimated coefficients fluctuate widely (columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) of Table D.6). For QE3, however, we find consistent effects across all categories (columns (2), (4), (6), and (8)): Coefficients are only significant in two of the categories but are positive and of similar magnitude across all of three of them. In particular, note that the coefficient for loans with a face value between 250k to 1m, the category with the highest aggregate volume, is significant.
[TABLE D.6 ABOUT HERE]
A bank that holds 12% of its assets in MBS instead of having no MBS holdings, increased the issuance of small business loans with a face value between 250k and 1m by about 4% after QE3. The magnitude is comparable to the magnitude of the effect on total C&I lending in Table 2 .
Appendix B Robustness
This section provides additional evidence to corroborate our main findings. In particular, we provide evidence to show that our main results are robust to different specifications and exposure measures. Table D .9 shows that the employment effect of QE3 is robust to a number of sample restrictions and to different definitions of the exposure measure. Columns (1) and (2) report results for our main regression (equation (5)) when we restrict the sample to counties that are relatively small as our banking market definition is arguably more likely to hold for smaller counties. The visual evidence in Figure 2 suggests that the concentration of banks with high MBS is particularly high in the Northeast corridor of the United States. Columns (3) and (4) show that results are unchanged when this region is excluded from the estimation. In columns (5) and (6), we calculate the exposure measure by using the MBS holdings of banks in the four quarters prior to QE1 instead of those holdings prior to QE3. Results are robust to this change, which is unsurprising as MBS holdings are highly autocorrelated within bank over time. Finally, columns (7) and (8) report results for calculating the exposure measure as MBS over total securities instead of MBS over total assets.
[TABLE D.9 ABOUT HERE]
A related concern is that quantitative easing led not only to a decline of MBS yields but also to a decline of long-term treasury yields (see, e.g., Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). As such, a bank's exposure to quantitative easing might be better captured by the sum of MBS and long-term treasury holdings. While we cannot measure long-term treasury holdings in the call reports separately, we re-estimated our main specifications using the sum of MBS and all treasury holdings as exposure measure. Given that only a small share of banks' assets is invested in treasuries (the average share during our sample period is less than 1%), the alternative exposure measure is very similar to our original one and, as a result, estimations with the alternative measure had little effect on conclusions.
Our main results are also robust to defining markets at the MSA level instead of the county level.
Firms may borrow and employees may work across county-lines, and therefore a county might not comprise a local credit or labor market. (1) and (2), the log of mortgage refinancing volume in columns (3) and (4), and the log of mortgage origination volume in columns (5) to (6). MBS-to-assets is averaged over the four quarters prior to each QE event. All specifications include bank and time fixed effects and bank-level controls, see Eq.
(2) for details. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the bank and quarter levels. Stars indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. This table reports estimates of the effect of banks' MBS-to-asset ratios on mortgage lending using Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) data. The outcome variable is the log of a bank's total C&I loans with loan volume less than $100k in columns (1) and (2), the log of total C&I loans with loan volume between $100k and $250k in columns (3) and (4), the log of total C&I loans with loan volume between $250k and $1m in columns (5) and (6), and the log of total C&I loans to businesses with revenue less than $1m in columns (7) and (8). MBS-to-assets is averaged over the four quarters prior to each QE event. All specifications include bank and time fixed effects and bank-level controls, see Eq.
(2) for details. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the bank and quarter levels. Stars indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (4) and Equation (5) for details. In columns (1) and (2), the sample is restricted to counties with population of more than 15000 and no more than 250000. In columns (3) and (4), the sample excludes the following states: Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Maine, New York, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont. In columns (5) and (6), exposure is based on the MBS holdings of banks in the 4 quarters prior to QE1. In columns (7) and (8), exposure is based on MBS over total securities instead of MBS over total assets. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county and quarter. Stars indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. This table reports estimates of the effect of MBS exposure on employment. The outcome variable is MSA-level quarterly growth of employment. MBS exposure is measured as banks' MBS-to-asset ratios, weighted by banks' average small business lending volume in a MSA prior to each QE event. All specifications include MSA and time fixed effects and MSA-level controls, see Equation (4) and Equation (5) for details. Column (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) report coefficients for the continuous treatment variable and column (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) report coefficients for the indicator treatment variable. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by MSA and quarter. Stars indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
